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The origins and boundaries of executive privilege
pecial Counsel Robert Mueller,
a number of congressional com
mittees and one or more grand
juries are actively investigating per
sons associated with President Don
ald Trump's presidential campaign
and administration for their complic
ity, if any, in Russia's interference in
the 2016 election.
When the president or persons
working with the president are under
investigations such as these, the doc
trine of executive privilege - which

S
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Constitutional Connections

entitles the president to keep confi
dential certain communications to
and from his advisers - inevitably be
comes relevant.
Indeed, multiple witnesses in the
Russia investigation have already re
fused to answer congressional ques
tions on the grounds that they do not
want to compromise the president's
ability to claim executive privilege.
So where does the doctrine of ex
ecutive privilege come from? And
what are its boundaries?

Let's start by discussing the role
privileges play in the law. Privileges
bar investigators from obtaining in
formation from certain sources. They
are grounded in the notion that,
within certain relationships and in
certain situations, the public's inter
est in obtaining information is not as
important as protecting privacy, au
tonomy, and free and open communi
cation.
SEE CONSTITUTION 03

Court frrst recognized doctrine of executive privilege in U.S. v. Nixon
things, entitles a criminal de
fendant to decline to testify
Critically, privileges pro
at trial. Also, article one's
tect specified individuals and speech and debate clause
relationships, but not the in
protects members of
formation itself. Investigators Congress (and their aides)
remain free to obtain the in
from having evidence of their
formation they are seeking
"legislative acts" used
from any unprivileged
against them in criminal or
source. Thus, a criminal de
civil proceedings.
fense attorney will not dis
Executive privilege is like
these latter privileges in that
close whether a client dis
cussed the whereabouts of a
its origins lie in the Constitu
weapon used in a crime. But tion. But it is unlike these
that does not prevent the
privileges in that there is no
prosecutor from discovering explicit textual basis for it in
the Constitution. Rather, the
the weapon's location
Supreme Court has justified
through other means.
Most privileges are rooted it as a necessary, if implicit,
in federal or state statutory
feature of our separation of
powers - one that protects
or common law. Familiar
statutory and common-law
the presidency from unwar
privileges include the just
ranted intrusions by the Leg
islature or judiciary.
mentioned attorney-client
privilege, the spousal privi
Ironically, the case in
lege, the doctor-patient privi which the Supreme Court
lege and the clergy privilege. first explicitly recognized the
But some privileges derive doctrine of executive privi
from the United States Con
lege, United States v. Ni.xon,
stitution. Most famously, the
is one of the foremost exam
Fifth Amendment contains a ples of the judiciary asserting
privilege against self-incrimi its supremacy vis-a-vis the
nation that, among other
other branches in interpret
CONSTITUTION FROM 01

ing the Constitution.
The Nixon decision was
handed down on July 25,
1974. It was the culmination
of a long battle over whether
the president was obliged to
provide a special prosecutor
with tape recordings of Oval
Office conversations about
how to handle the fallout
from the June 17, 1972, bur
glary of Democratic National
Committee headquarters in
Washington's Watergate of
fice complex.
President Nixon made two
arguments in support of with
holding the tapes. First, he
claimed an absolute presi
dential entitlement - not sub
ject to court review - to keep
private any communication
he made or received in the
discharge of his duties. The
Supreme Court rejected this
argument, holding that it was
the court's prerogative, not
the president's, to say what if
anything the Constitution
permits the president to
shield from investigators
seeking evidence of a crime.
Second, he made an alter

native argument that, even if
the president lacks an abso
lute entitlement to withhold
presidential communications,
the court should recognize
that the president has a con
stitutional entitlement - that
is, a constitutional executive
privilege - to withhold "confi
dential" communications
made or received in the dis
charge of his duties.
The court accepted this
second argument, in part.
The court agreed that, even
though the Constitution does
not mention executive privi
lege, our constitutional struc
ture implies a presidential
entitlement to withhold confi
dential communications from
investigators in ordinary cir
cumstances. Otherwise, the
president and his aides "may
well temper candor with a
concern for appearances and
for their own interests to the
detriment of the decision
making process."
But, the court further
held, the interests underlying
this qualified executive privi
lege are outweighed by the

judicial branch's interest do
ing justice in criminal prose
cutions - at least in cases
where there has been no ad
ditional showing of a need to
protect military, diplomatic or
national security secrets.
The court ordered that the
tapes be produced. The pres
ident complied and simulta
neously made them public.
The tapes showed that he
had attempted to interfere
with the FBl's investigation
of the Watergate burglary.
Three days after disclosure,
on August 9, 1974, President
Nixon became the first and
only president to resign from
office.
Since the Ni.xon decision,
the Supreme Court has con
sidered an issue of executive
privilege only once. In 2004,
while reviewing preliminary
procedural rulings in a civil
lawsuit seeking to force dis
closure of members of an en
ergy task force chaired by
Vice President Dick Cheney,
the court discussed executive
privilege and made clear that
it is significantly more pro

tective of the president's pri
vacy in the civil context than
in the criminal context. But
the court did not resolve
whether the doctrine applied;
it simply remanded the case
for further consideration.
So as matters now stand,
we know that the Constitu
tion provides the president
with a privilege to withhold
confidential communications
from investigators. The privi
leged is qualified, however,
and is significantly less likely
to apply in the context of a
criminal investigation than in
other contexts. As the Russia
investigation proceeds, it will
be interesting to see whether
President Trump formally in
vokes executive privilege
and, if he does, whether the
courts uphold his claim.
(John Greabe teaches con
stitutional law and related
subjects at the University of
New Hampshire Sc1wol of
Law. He also serves on the
board oftrustees of the New
Hampshire Institute for
Civics Edu.cation.)

